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4.0 Who Mobilizes? An Analysis 
of Stakeholder Responses to
Financial Regulatory Consultations
Stefano Pagliari1 and Kevin L. Young2
4.1 Introduction
The making of financial regulatory policy is often a contested terrain in
which a variety of stakeholders, ranging from trade associations to
consumer groups, mobilize over and contribute to the process of
contemporary financial rulemaking. As a number of contributions in
this publication make clear, the characteristics of the engagement of
different stakeholders constitute not only an important determinant
of what rules will be implemented, but also of whether the regulation
will unduly favour certain stakeholders over others. Despite this
widespread recognition, existing scholarship in this area has failed 
to pay adequate attention to which stakeholders mobilize in the
financial regulatory rulemaking process, and what this means for our
understanding of how regulatory capture might be mitigated.
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This chapter will present the findings of a recent survey of written
letter responses from stakeholders to financial regulatory
consultations. Our analysis reveals a number of significant empirical
trends in terms of which groups mobilize over financial regulation
more than others, how and where stakeholder mobilization is
different in finance as opposed to other areas of regulation, and
whether or not the recent financial crisis has affected these trends.
We show evidence that while the mobilization of stakeholders outside
the business community is very low, financial regulatory policies also
attract the mobilization of a greater diversity of business participants
than is commonly acknowledged by theories of regulatory capture.
Our analysis is divided into three parts. In the first part we review
some of the existing literature which has explored why the rule setting
phase of financial regulation is understood to be associated with a
very particular kind of stakeholder mobilization. In the second part we
explicate results from a new dataset on response letters to financial
regulatory policy consultations by different kinds of stakeholder
groups. The third part then lays out some of the implications of our
findings.
4.2 Sectoral diversity in the financial rulemaking process – a review
of the literature
The interaction with different business groups, consumer groups and
other stakeholders through formal consultations and bilateral
meetings represents a central mechanism through which regulatory
authorities gauge information regarding the impact that different
regulatory decisions may have on different groups, as well as their
general sentiment. In a complex environment such as in financial
markets where the outcome of regulatory policies is characterized by
a significant degree of uncertainty, the capacity to continuously
receive information and feedback from stakeholders is deemed crucial
to produce informed regulatory policies and limit their unintended
consequences.
At the same time, the characteristics of mobilizing different groups
which seek to influence the rulemaking process are also considered to
3 Baker (2010). ‘Restraining regulatory capture? Anglo- America, crisis politics and
trajectories of change in global financial governance’, International Affairs, 86(3): 647-
63.
4 Mattli and Woods (2009). In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global
Politics, The Politics of Global Regulation. Mattli and Woods. Princeton, NJ, Princeton
University Press.
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be one of the factors influencing the potential that regulation will be
captured by special interests. In this regard, regulatory capture is
understood as more likely to occur in those instances where the
mobilization of a narrow range of groups directly targeted by a given
regulation will dominate the policymaking process, while other, more
diffuse groups such as consumer groups will be hindered from making
their mark. In contrast, when stakeholder mobilization is more diverse
the opposite effect is anticipated. A more diverse set of stakeholders
mobilizing would ensure that regulators are exposed to a greater
variety of information and perspectives, as well as reduce their
dependency on the information received by any single group of
stakeholders, reducing the risk of capture.
From this perspective, the literature on financial regulatory
policymaking in particular has often presented finance as an area
particularly prone to capture. A number of reasons have been posited
as likely to constrain the plurality of stakeholders mobilizing in financial
regulatory policymaking. First, the technical complexity that
characterizes financial regulatory debates increases the information
asymmetries between the financial groups directly targeted by the
specific piece of regulation and other stakeholders, thus limiting the
capacity of the latter group to actually engage.3 Second, the temporary
horizon within which the costs and benefits of regulatory measures will
manifest themselves varies across different stakeholders. While the
costs imposed by more stringent regulatory policies are more readily
apparent to the financial industry group being directly targeted, the
impact of financial regulatory policies on other stakeholders may be
more indirect and difficult to decipher in the short-term, thus limiting
the incentives of these groups to mobilize.4 Third, even when the costs
of different regulatory solutions are also easier to detect in the short-
term for those stakeholders that are only indirectly affected, the
capacity of stakeholders, such as investors and consumers of financial
5 Olson (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups,
Harvard University Press.
6 Young (2012). ‘Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the
transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.’ Review of
International Political Economy.
7 Lall (2011). ‘From failure to failure: The politics of international banking regulation.’
Review of International Political Economy.
8 Mattli and Woods (2009), op. cit. in footnote 2.
9 Culpepper (2011). Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe
and Japan, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
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services, to mobilize to protect their interests is constrained by the
diffuse nature of these stakeholders and the limited organizational
resources available to overcome collective action problems.5 Fourth,
the informal institutional context within which financial regulatory
policies are developed is frequently described as constraining the
mobilization of a plurality of stakeholders. The participation of financial
industry groups is facilitated by the existing network they share with
regulators, fostered by the common professional experiences, training,
and revolving doors that link these actors together in a common “policy
network”.6 The existence of this tight-knit community between
regulators and the financial industry groups under their surveillance is
often seen as an obstacle hindering the mobilization of those outsiders
seeking to “break in” to the relatively closed financial regulatory policy
network.7
Thus for a range of different reasons existing scholarship suggests 
that the plurality of stakeholders involved in financial regulatory
policymaking should be quite low. While there is widespread
agreement on this point, some scholarship emphasizes the cyclical
nature of such a condition. Specifically, events such as financial crises
or corporate scandals are understood to bring the distributional
consequences of financial regulation into sharper focus, thus 
better enabling different stakeholders to assess the distributional
consequences of financial regulation. In turn, such dynamics create a
window of opportunity for policy entrepreneurs that would not
normally mobilize to engage in the policymaking process, and add
greater plurality to the regulatory debate.8 For this reason, we might
expect the diversity of actors involved to increase in the aftermath of
crises and scandals.9
10 This section draws upon data and analysis in ‘Leveraged Interests: The Role of
Corporate-Financial Coalitions in the Regulation of Finance’ by Pagliari and Young
(2012). Currently Under Review. Available at www.stefanopagliari.net
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4.3 An empirical investigation of stakeholder mobilization in finance
While there are strong theoretical reasons why the diversity of
stakeholders active in the financial regulatory arena may be
constrained, this characteristic of the financial regulatory process is an
empirical question. Furthermore, it is one frequently assumed but not
assessed empirically in a systematic fashion. Who mobilizes in the
financial regulatory policymaking process?
One key empirical resource for answering this question is provided by
the common tendency in recent years for financial regulatory agencies
to open regulatory proposals to formal consultative processes. Since
the early 2000s in particular, regulatory agencies have undertaken
policy consultations which ask for formal written comments by
interested groups. Although policy consultations do not represent the
only mechanism available for advocacy, the publicly available written
responses to these consultations do provide a relatively systematic
“trace” of which actors tend to mobilize in response to different
regulatory policies.
As part of a larger study,10 we generated a new dataset composed of
the written responses of different stakeholders to a variety of policy
consultations. These policy consultations took place in a wide variety
of institutional contexts, in a number of different countries, and across
a time period between 1997 (when data first started to become
available) and 2012. While most of our data includes responses from
the United States, our dataset also includes responses from Canada,
Germany, and the United Kingdom. Given the greater relevance of
financial regulatory policymaking occurring at a supranational level,
we have also included different policy consultations held by the
European Commission, as well as from international regulatory
institutions such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and
the International Organization of Securities Commissions. In total we
coded 13,466 comment letters in response to 292 different policy
consultations across finance and other sectors, covering a total of 58
different governance bodies, ranging from the US Food and Drug
Administration to the Canadian Council for Insurance Regulation to
the Directorate-General for Internal Market within the European
Commission.11
Table 1 summarizes the different kinds of stakeholders who respond to
consultations around financial regulatory policies. These findings show
how the diversity of interest group mobilization around financial
regulatory policymaking appears relatively constrained. In this sense,
NGO mobilization is a relatively rare occurrence. So too is the
mobilization of interest groups representing more “diffuse”
constituencies, such as consumer protection groups and trade unions.
Private business organizations – composed of firms, associations, and
coalitions of business groups – clearly dominate financial regulatory
policymaking. Yet the business community is a heterogeneous group.
Which kind of businesses respond to financial sector consultations? To
answer this question, we broke down this category according to the
sector and industry of the different business respondents. For each
policy consultation we have differentiated between three different
groups of respondents: 1) those business groups that were directly
targeted for regulation (“Target Group”); 2) other financial business
groups who are not the direct target of the regulatory measure
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11 Of this total, 146 consultations concerned financial regulation of some kind, with
6379 response letters coded. 158 consultations concerned areas of regulation other
than finance, with a total of 8196 response letters coded. For a more detailed
description of the dataset see the Appendix in Pagliari and Young (2012).
Table 1: Percentage of Respondents to Financial Sector Consultations
Respondent Percentage of Total 
Comment Letters
Trade Unions 1.47
Consumer Groups 1.15
Research Institutions 3.65
NGOs 6.67
Business Groups 87.06
(“Sectoral Cohabitants”); and 3) business respondents from outside
finance (“Outsiders”). For instance, in the case of banking regulation,
banks and banking associations would be the “target group”, credit
rating agencies or insurance companies would be “sectoral cohabitants”,
while manufacturing companies or agricultural associations would be
“outsiders”. The results of this analysis, summarized in Table 2, show
how financial sector consultations are characterized by a plurality of
different kinds of business respondents, with almost a quarter of the
respondents being non-financial business groups.
Table 2: Percentage of Business Reponses to Financial Sector Consultations
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The importance of non-financial business groups in financial
regulatory debates has further been increased in the regulatory
response to the global financial crisis. Using September 2008 as a
dividing line among all written response letters, Table 3 illustrates the
composition of respondents to financial sector consultations before
and after the global financial crisis, with the column on the right
calculating the percentage change over the two periods.
Table 3: Percentage of Respondents to Financial Sector Consultations, 
Before and After the Global Financial Crisis
Category of Business
Respondent
Explanation of Category Percentage of Total
Comment Letters
Target Group The respondent is the direct target of
regulation.
45.12
Sectoral Cohabitant The respondent is in the financial sector,
but is not being targeted directly.
29.94
Outsider The respondent is outside the financial
sector.
24.95
Respondent Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis % Difference
Trade Unions 0.31 2.02 +548
Consumer Protection 1.48 1.00 –32.41
Research Institutions 4.40 3.29 –25.07
NGOs 2.26 8.77 +288.73
Business Groups 91.56 84.92 –7.25
of Business Groups:
Target Group 46.88 44.22 –5.66
Sectoral Cohabitants 35.19 27.24 –22.58
Outsiders 17.93 28.53 +59.08
These results suggest that the plurality of groups mobilizing over
financial regulatory policymaking has changed in some important
ways since the crisis. In particular, the number of trade union
organizations, NGOs, and non-financial end users of financial services
has increased significantly since the crisis, thus significantly
diversifying the sectoral origin of groups which mobilize and limiting
the predominance of financial industry groups targeted by regulation.
But how unique is the mobilization of stakeholders around financial
regulatory policies compared to the regulation of other sectors? In order
to assess this question, we also compared these financial consultations
to a wide variety of consultations around regulatory policies concerning
other sectors of the economy. In this regard, we selected consultations
within sectors which each had (varying) similarities with the financial
sector and which also emerge in discussions of regulatory capture.
Specifically, we included consultations on the regulation of the energy
sector, the health care industry, the agricultural sector, and the media
and telecommunications industry. Table 4 illustrates our comparative
results, showing the percentage of respondents across different sectors.
Table 4: Percentage of Respondents to Consultations in Different Regulated Areas
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Taken together, these results illustrate a number of empirical
regularities that may be significant for understanding the dynamics of
private sector influence in the policymaking process and the potential
for capture. The first pattern which emerges in this data is the low
level of civil society organizations such as NGOs as respondents to
Respondent Agriculture Energy Telecoms Health Finance
Trade Unions 1.07 1.12 1.06 0.32 1.47
Consumer Protection 0.74 0.94 0.92 1.83 1.15
Research Institutions 5.23 3.97 1.42 9.06 3.65
NGOs 14.22 9.14 3.48 10.84 6.67
Business Groups 78.74 84.83 93.12 77.94 87.06
of Business Groups:
Target Group 83.18 69.68 84.07 64.71 45.12
Sectoral Cohabitants 5.71 11.07 11.28 19.10 29.94
Outsiders 11.12 19.25 4.65 16.19 24.94
financial sector consultations. Financial regulation features a very low
level of engagement of consumer protection groups, although this is
not strikingly different from other regulated sectors. Research
institutions are less engaged in financial regulatory consultations than
in most other sectors – a surprising finding given the highly technical
nature of financial regulation.
A second pattern is the significantly greater diversity of business
groups that tend to mobilize in response to financial sector
consultations. When it comes to financial regulation, there appears to
be greater mobilization of business groups that are not directly
targeted by regulation than in any other sector, both from within the
same sector (“Sectoral Cohabitants”) than from the rest of the
economy (“Outsiders”). Interestingly, only the regulation of the energy
sector features a comparable number of outsiders mobilizing.
These results stand in contrast to the expectations of those theories of
regulatory capture which have postulated that the diversity of actors
mobilizing around financial regulatory policies would be hindered by
collective action problems and information asymmetries. Instead, the
analysis in this section reveals how the mobilization of groups
surrounding the development of financial rules is different from what
we find in the regulation of other areas, and most importantly, more
sectorally diverse than theories of regulatory capture assume. This
anomaly can be explained in part by considering the special position
that the financial sector occupies in the rest of the economy and the
numerous ties that link financial firms with the real economy, either
directly or indirectly. Since numerous financial regulatory policies are
likely to have an impact over the rest of the economy, this may create
strong incentives for a broader range of business groups to mobilize.
4.4 Policy implications
What are the policy implications of this analysis for the potential that
a piece of financial regulation will unduly narrowly favour the
stakeholders being regulated? Our analysis above suggests two broad
implications.
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12 See Pagliari and Young (2012) for an explication of this phenomenon.
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On the one hand, the relative under-representation of stakeholders
outside of the business community, in particular consumer advocates,
NGOs, and trade unions within financial sector policymaking
compared to other areas of economic policymaking, suggests that the
likely diversity of perspectives and concerns that reach the regulatory
process is limited in important ways. Non-business groups have the
potential to represent diffuse interests in society that might be under-
represented by the business community. The greater diversity of
actors who mobilize within the business community might be
interpreted as limiting the risk that any onset of special interests will
disproportionately influence the policymaking process, by creating
greater potential for these groups to “balance” each other out.
However, there are other reasons to suggest that the opposite
outcome might result. Manufacturing firms that mobilize over
financial regulation do not necessarily advocate opposing positions as
do banks when it comes to bank regulation; nor is it necessarily the
case that agricultural stakeholders oppose the views and the advocacy
of institutional investors. Owing to the unique structural location of
finance in the economy – as private progenitors and managers of
credit – the short-term preferences of non-financial business groups
might actually be more often aligned with financial sector groups than
opposed to their positions.
Indeed, since the financial crisis in particular efforts to regulate numerous
areas of finance, such as hedge funds, banking, and derivatives regulation
have featured cross-sectoral business coalitions comprising both financial
and non-financial business groups.12 In this context, financial industry
groups have actively altered their lobbying strategies in order to tie their
interests to those of other non-financial stakeholders, highlighting the
diffuse costs of new regulatory rules. One example of such a strategy is
the fact that the publication of the Basel III agreement was preceded by
a publication of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), the main
association representing internationally active banks, which denounced
the costs the implementation of the Basel III agreement would pose on
the real economy. The IIF asserted these costs would be as far as eight
13 IIF (2010). ‘Interim Report on the Cumulative Impact on the Global Economy of
Proposed Changes in the Banking Regulatory Framework’, Institute of International
Finance.
14 AIMA (2009). ‘European Directive Could Cost European Pension Industry 25 Billion
Euros Annually’, London, Alternative Investment Management Association.
15 ISDA (2010). ‘US Companies May Face US $1 Trillion in Additional Capital and
Liquidity Requirements As a Result of Financial Regulatory Reform, According to ISDA
Research’, International Swaps and Derivatives Associations.
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times higher than those estimated by the Basel Committee.13 Hedge Fund
associations such as the Alternative Investment Management Association
(AIMA) have directed their opposition to the Alternative Investment Fund
Manager Directive (AIFMD) by highlighting the costs that the regulation
would pose for pension funds across Europe, declaring that ‘[i]f they
suffer lower returns as a result of the Directive, it’s not only Europe’s
pension funds but Europe’s pensioners of both today and tomorrow who
will suffer’.14 Banks that act as derivative dealers have claimed that the
measures introduced by US Congress to regulate OTC derivatives markets
would cost US companies as much as $1 trillion in terms of capital
requirements, thus decreasing their capacity to generate employment
opportunities.15 In many of these and other instances financial industry
groups have been joined by non-financial businesses and trade
associations who share similar concerns and partially overlapping policy
agendas.
This strategy has often been effective as elected politicians are
generally wary of introducing regulatory measures that may negatively
affect employment and growth, in particular during a period of weak
economic growth. Under these conditions, regulators are likely to face
strong pressures from a plurality of business groups as well as their
political masters to be more lenient in the implementation of
regulatory policies that may harm the economy, or if a trade-off exists
between the goal of bolstering the safety of financial institutions and
preserving the flow of credit to the rest of the economy.
In these cases, the mobilization of a broader variety of business groups
inside and outside finance does not necessarily mitigate the capacity 
of financial groups to capture the policymaking process, but may
actually reinforce their influence in the policymaking process. The
acknowledgement of this possibility has led important commentators
16 Johnson (2011). ‘Deceptive Lobbying on Derivatives’, New York Times, Economix
Blog, 17 February 2011.
17 Paletta (2010), ‘Late Change Sparks Outcry Over Finance-Overhaul Bill’, Wall Street
Journal, 1 July 2010.
18 Schwarcz (forthcoming). ‘Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment
Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation’, in Preventing Regulatory
Capture: Special Interest Influence, and How to Limit It, by Carpenter and Moss
(forthcoming). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
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and policymakers to flag ‘deceptive lobbying’,16 wherein Representative
Barney Frank warned against the risk of financial institutions ‘taking the
end users in effect as hostages to get out from under some of these
requirements’.17 The extent of such practices and others like it is
unknown, but it does appear that financial industry groups tend to be
increasingly savvy at connecting their own advocacy endeavours to the
fate of other groups in the business community.
How is it possible to ensure that the mobilization of business 
groups in financial regulatory policymaking mitigates rather than
reinforces the influence of those special interests? First, the relative
under-representation within financial regulatory policymaking of
stakeholders from outside the business community compared to other
sectors suggests that public policy intervention should be deployed
towards enhancing the capacity of voices outside the business
community to participate in the regulatory process. The objective of
redressing some groups’ underrepresentation may also require the
pooling of resources to subsidize the mobilization of existing
consumer groups, or the creation of independent agencies tasked to
represent these concerns in the regulatory process.18
Second, beyond granting channels of access to the policymaking
process, public policy intervention should be directed towards
facilitating the capacity of those groups for whom the impact of the
regulation in question is less immediate, such non-financial end users,
in order to allow these groups to assess the impact that specific
financial regulatory issues will have on them. For instance, granting full
access to the information available to regulators, including their data,
analyses, and draft texts, could compensate, at least in part, for the
information asymmetry between the financial industry groups target
of regulation and other stakeholders.19 These mechanisms may reduce
19 Ayres and Braithwaite (2006). ‘Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment’,
Law & Social Inquiry, 16(3): 435-96.
20 Hall and Deardorff (2006). ‘Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy’, American Political
Science Review, 100(1): 69-84.
21 See Green (this volume), and Valencia and Ueda (2012), ‘Central Bank
Independence and Macro-prudential Regulation’, IMF Working Paper, WP/12/101,
International Monetary Fund.
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the risk that the mobilization of non-financial stakeholders will not
occur uniquely around the information provided by financial industry
groups targeted for regulation.
Third, regulators should play a more careful game when setting out
new regulatory reforms. Interest group advocacy can be conceived 
as an ‘informational subsidy’20 to policymakers’ efforts to understand
the impact of regulatory policies. This may be helpful in particular
circumstances, but it is only logical that most outside stakeholders have
incentives to over-represent this impact. The distortions that this may
bring to the policymaking process may be mitigated by developing a
more standardized and transparent process of cost-benefit analysis
within the regulatory policymaking process itself, by endowing
regulatory agencies with more capacity to conduct robust impact
analysis before policies are released, as well as by delegating the task
of estimating the costs of regulatory policies to independent task forces
capable of providing an independent and expert assessment.
Fourth, the anticipation of a widespread mobilization of financial and
non-financial groups around the implementation of regulatory policies
which may potentially impact the real economy signifies that
regulators need to be given a clearer mandate regarding how to
navigate the trade-off that often exists between bolstering financial
stability and protecting the flow of credit to the real economy. This
represents a grey area in the mandate of regulatory agencies and 
such ambiguity creates room for undue influence in the regulatory
process of short-term political pressures. At the same time, greater
independence from the political process is required to allow regulators
to withstand widespread pressure which could emerge during a
downturn to water down the implementation of reforms in order to
limit any negative impact on the real economy.21
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4.5 Conclusion
In this research note we have explored the unique kind of stakeholder
mobilization that surrounds the rule-setting phase of financial
regulation. Explicating some results from a new dataset on response
letters to a variety of different regulatory policy consultations, 
we illustrated two important features of financial regulatory
policymaking. First, financial regulation appears to be associated with
a less plural degree of stakeholder mobilization when it comes to non-
business groups such as NGOs, trade unions and consumer groups.
Second, we demonstrated that when it comes to the mobilization of
different stakeholders within the business community itself, financial
regulation is associated with a great plurality of groups which mobilize.
While this latter result might be interpreted as limiting the ability of
financial industry groups to exercise excessive influence over the
regulatory process, we have argued that there are reasons to think
otherwise, since many non-financial business groups share similar
concerns about the diffuse costs of financial regulation. Different
policy adjustments are required to ensure that this business plurality
may function as a mitigating factor against the risk of capture, rather
than amplifying the influence of special interests.
